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E. Donald Elliott-
Risk and Culture' by anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scien-
tist Aaron Wildavsky proves that a whole is sometimes less than some of
its parts. The book consists of two interwoven but separable parts: (1) an
abstract theory of the relationship between risk and culture; and (2) an
application of the theory to explain "the sudden, widespread, across-the-
board concern about environmental pollution and personal contamination
that has arisen in the Western world in general and with particular force
in the United States"2 (a phenomenon that I will call "envi-
ronmentalism").
Most readers will be struck not by the abstract theory but by its appli-
cation to the rise of environmentalism. This emphasis is unfortunate. The
attempt to "explain" environmentalism makes a few good points, but on
the whole this part of the book is crude, shortsighted, and snide.3 On the
other hand, the sections that consider the relationship between risk and
culture on a more fundamental level are sensitive and thoughtful.
Even at its best, Risk and Culture is not entirely successful at explain-
ing the paradox of risk-the problem of managing the unknown-but
parts of the book deserve to be read seriously by people interested in the
problem of risk, including environmental lawyers.
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECH-
NICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. P. 10.
3. See Winner, Pollution as Delusion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 8, 18




One cannot adequately appreciate Douglas and Wildavsky's position
from a mere recitation of their conclusions. The scope and texture of their
argument must be set out at some length.
Risk and Culture begins with the proposition that "total knowledge"
would be necessary for us to understand the risks we face.4 The number
of possible dangers is infinite, and "[s]ince no one can attend to every-
thing, some sort of priority must be established among dangers."5 Douglas
and Wildavsky reason that "[o]nly social consent keeps an issue out of
contention," and therefore that the perception of risk is itself a social
process.6
Douglas and Wildavsky insist that their cultural theory of risk percep-
tion does not ignore the reality of the dangers.' Their point is that "social
principles" determine which "real dangers" we select for attention: "No
doubt the water in fourteenth century Europe was a persistent health haz-
ard, but a cultural theory of [risk] perception would point out that it be-
came a public preoccupation only when it seemed plausible to accuse Jews
of poisoning the wells."8
According to Douglas and Wildavsky, environmentalism is like the fear
that Jews are poisoning the wells; it has been selected for public attention
because it supports a certain kind of "social criticism."' The reason that
asbestos poisoning gets more attention than skin cancer caused by sun-
bathing, we are told, is that asbestos "justifies a particular anti-industrial
criticism," whereas "there is no obvious way in which the incidence of
skin cancer caused by leisure-time sunburn can be mobilized for criticism
of industry, and so we hear less of it."10
According to Douglas and Wildavsky, environmentalism is caused by
the rise of sectarianism, an outlook that emphasizes goodness, equality,
and purity of heart and mind." Sectarianism in turn is a response to the
"problems of voluntary organization," the problems groups face trying to
"hold their members together without coercion."12 Douglas and Wildav-
sky do not exactly portray environmentalism as a conspiracy, but they do
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itive tribes and religious sects, environmentalists use fear of attack or infil-
tration from an evil world outside to keep their followers in line. "Infiltra-
tion from the evil world appears as Satanism, witchcraft, or their modern
equivalent-hidden technological contamination that invades the body of
nature and of man." 14
Extending Mary Douglas' provocative earlier work on pollution be-
liefs,15 Risk and Culture contends that "there is not much difference be-
tween modern times and ages past" when it comes to "selection and prior-
ity among real dangers."1 The book raises but rejects the distinction
between modern and primitive ways of thought drawn by LUvy-Bruhl:
[A]fter millennia . . . in which dangers were said to be caused by
witchcraft and taboo-breaking, our distinctive achievement was to in-
vent the idea of natural death and actually believe in it. The concept
of the accident rate and of normal chances of incurring disease be-
longs to the modern, scientific way of thinking .. . . [T]he defining
feature of primitive mentality is to try to nail a cause for every mis-
fortune; and the defining feature of modernity, to forbear to ask.17
With the rise of environmentalism, this distinction between modern and
primitive modes of thought has collapsed as people have stopped "forbear-
ing to ask" why they die of cancer, heart disease, or old age. Douglas and
Wildavsky see the new consciousness not as progress but as a return to
premodernism. L~vy-Bruhl would be astonished, we are told, to behold
"moderns using advanced technology and asking those famous primitive
questions as if there were no such thing as natural death, no purely physi-
cal facts, no regular accident rates, no normal incidence of disease ....
[W]e have joined the primitives in refusing to quench our concern."1 8
These changes in political attitudes have merely fostered an "institutional-
ized mistrust"1 and have enlarged "the scope of making someone pay for
each misfortune we undergo." 20
Douglas and Wildavsky compare our culture's concern about pollution
with the "pollution beliefs" of the Hima, a nomadic tribe of northwestern
Ankole. The reader is challenged to "discern differences between 'us' and
'them' in the way that dangers are selected for public concern."21 The
14. Pp. 10-11 (emphasis added).
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Hima believe that cows, their primary source of food, will die if a person
eats agricultural products within twelve hours after consuming milk.22
The Hima's pollution beliefs, like ours, are said to refer to "real dangers,
for cows do die and get lost and their milk does dry up."23 Among the
Hima, "reactionaries" use pollution to fight a "rearguard action against
change," whereas in our society the "critics" use pollution to support their
arguments against "immoral forms of economic and political power. "24
The thesis that risk selection has a social or cultural component would
be provocative enough, but Douglas and Wildavsky go beyond this thesis
to argue that "[e]ach form of social life has its own typical risk portfolio.
. . . [E]ach social arrangement elevates some risks to a high peak and
depresses others below sight."125 According to Douglas and Wildavsky, the
voluntary organizations to which we belong determine the views we hold:
The conditions of voluntary organization cause sectarians to invoke
God and claim higher spiritual worth than the rest of the world. But
it is not so much that they chose first to criticize the central institu-
tions and therefore formed the sect. Rather it was the other way
around: they combined voluntarily and, as a result of problems and
strategies, they found the scope to criticize . . . . Inevitably they
must see the risks in the world from a different perspective.26
In the most stimulating part of their argument, Douglas and Wildavsky
sketch connections between various forms of social organization and per-
ceptions of risk. According to their typology, groups can be "border" or
"center," and "sectarian" or "hierarchical." The "center" tends to ignore
"long-term and low-probability" risks, while the "border" predicts "im-
minent disaster."2" Industrial corporations are "center" and "hierarchi-
cal," while environmental groups are "border" and either "sectarian" or
"hierarchical."
Douglas and Wildavsky compare a series of "border" groups with dif-
ferent forms of organization: the Hutterites, the Amish, the Sierra Club,
the Friends of the Earth, and the anti-nuclear Clamshell Alliance. They
contend that "[t]he more that a public interest group is organized as a





26. P. 121. Thus, Douglas and Wildavsky go beyond the familiar point that the problems of
forming and holding voluntary organizations together explain why people with particular views suc-
ceed in forming politically effective groups. See Wilson, Introduction to THE POLrICS OF REGULA-
TION at vii-xii (J.Q. Wilson ed. 1980); c. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrlVE ACTION (rev. ed.
1971) (theoretical description of problems of organizing voluntary groups).
27. P. 122.
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tal changes and speaks frankly for its own perceived interests."28 Thus,
they assert (without supporting evidence) that unlike the sectarian Friends
of the Earth, the hierarchical Sierra Club has always been prepared to
make "compromises with economic demands." 29
In their final chapter, Douglas and Wildavsky widen their focus to con-
sider the implications of their view of risk as a "collective construct."8
Although they insist that their position is not relativistic, Douglas and
Wildavsky do see knowledge as only
the changing product of social activity. . . an open-ended communal
enterprise. . . a ship voyaging to an unknown destination but never
arriving and never dropping anchor. It [knowledge] is like a many-
sided conversation in which being ultimately right or wrong is not at
issue. What matters is that the conversation continue with new defi-
nitions and solutions and terms made deep enough to hold the mean-
ings being tried. 1
Reflecting their notion that right and wrong are not what "matters,"
Douglas and Wildavsky insist that the opinions of experts are not entitled
to special weight on risk issues. Risk is not "a straightforward conse-
quence of the dangers inherent in the physical situation." 2 It is the prod-
uct of "shared beliefs and values."33
II.
Douglas and Wildavsky's account of environmentalism is unsatisfactory
for a number of reasons, but two in particular stand out: It reduces cul-
ture to a theory of the structure of environmental groups; and it fails to
give proper weight to rational factors, such as science and economics, in
explaining the increased attention policymakers have given to the
environment.
A. Culture as Group Structure
Douglas and Wildavsky promise a cultural theory of risk perception
that will explain the sudden increase in public concern about environmen-
tal pollution. They end up with a theory that reduces culture to a single
factor: the organizational structure of groups. Douglas and Wildavsky
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to environmental groups. One might expect the family, education, religion,
government, and the press-none of which they discuss-to be far more
influential than environmental groups in shaping our perceptions of
risks.34
Even taking Douglas and Wildavsky's argument on its own terms,
there are major difficulties. Suppose that the Sierra Club does behave as
they claim. The relationship between the structure of environmental
groups and the positions they advocate might make a worthwhile topic.
But it is a far cry from the problem that Douglas and Wildavsky purport
to address-the dramatic increase in public concern about environmental
pollution.
The structure of environmental groups cannot explain the sudden out-
pouring of public support for legal control of environmental pollutants,
since only a tiny fraction of the population has ever formally belonged to
an environmental group.3 5 A cultural theory of risk selection should not
aspire to tell us why environmental groups struck the particular notes
they did, but why those notes resonated with such force through the
culture.
Douglas and Wildavsky offer little enlightenment on the crucial ques-
tion of why society embraced the positions advocated by "border" environ-
mental groups. They tick off a series of banal political explanations that
range from a tradition of "political sectarianism" in American culture 6 to
tax exemptions for public interest groups. 37 These explanations are hard
to square with the fact that environmentalism was also on the rise in other
industrialized nations where the conditions Douglas and Wildavsky em-
phasize did not exist.38 Douglas and Wildavsky do not discuss environ-
34. As one illustration of the kinds of cultural influences that Douglas and Wildavsky overlook,
consider literary critic Stephen Greenblatt's observation:
[I]n the West, since the onset of the early modern period, the archetypal rules, the earliest and
most systematic to which the child is exposed and in which he is trained are those governing
the definition and control of wastes. The behavior manuals of the fifteenth through the eight-
eenth centuries return again and again to codes elaborated for the management of the body's
products: urine, feces, mucus, saliva and wind.
Greenblatt, Filthy Rites, DAEDALUS, Summer 1982, at 1, 2. The analogy between human body and
world is one of the most powerful and persistent images in our culture. See L. BARKAN, NATURE'S
WORK OF ART: THE HUMAN BODY AS IMAGE OF THE WORLD (1975).
35. A comprehensive analysis of public opinion polls for the early 1970's by the then-White
House adviser responsible for environmental issues, J. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRON-
MENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 2-16 (1976), concluded that
the "unprecedented speed and urgency" with which environmental issues burst into the American
consciousness was "[a] miracle of public opinion," id. at 16; see A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORM-
ANCE: CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 19 (1980).
36. Pp. 152-57.
37. Pp. 165-67.
38. See, e.g., Currie, Air Pollution Control in West Germany, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 391-93
(1982) (describing "enormous similarities" between American and West German air pollution laws
despite "quite disparate legal traditions"); D. Vogel, Coercion Versus Consultation: A Comparison of
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mentalism in any other industrialized Western cultures-a serious omis-
sion in a book that treats culture as the primary determinant of attitudes
toward risk.
In losing sight of culture and focusing on environmental groups, Doug-
las and Wildavsky mistake a few of the dancers for the dance.
B. Science, Economics, and the "Real Dangers" Fallacy
There is a relatively straightforward explanation for the simultaneous
rise of environmentalism in a number of industrialized Western cultures.
These countries share a concept of the state that leads to governmental
action in response to scientific evidence that environmental pollution dam-
ages public health and economic information that control is practicable.
Science, with its potential to identify causes of natural events, is one
factor that distinguishes contemporary "pollution beliefs" from magic and
witchcraft in primitive cultures. The difference between science and su-
perstition has sometimes been exaggerated:39 Science does not eliminate
judgment and disagreement, nor does it establish immutable truths.40 But
it is also misleading to treat pollution beliefs based on science and those
based on superstition as equivalent.
Douglas and Wildavsky obscure important differences betweeen science
and superstition by describing pollution beliefs in both modern and primi-
tive cultures as equally based on "real dangers."4 1 The dangers are not
real in the same way. The Hima's cows die all right, but not because their
owners have eaten agricultural products. The Hima conception of pollu-
tion rests on a false supposition about a causal link between events. On
the other hand, asbestos really does cause diseases that kill workers.
There is an important difference between a society that uses false con-
sciousness and one that uses science as the basis for its pollution beliefs."2
Environmental Protection Policy in the United States and Great Britain 5 (Sept. 1980) (paper
presented to Am. Political Science Ass'n Annual Convention) (describing substantial disparities be-
tween environmental policies in U.S. and Britain despite fact that "the politics of contemporary Brit-
ish and American environmental movements have been remarkably similar").
39. See J. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION 825-27 (abridged
ed. 1950). Frazer, one of the leading cultural anthropologists of an earlier generation, used mankind's
progression from magic, to religion, to science as the central organizing idea for his work. Douglas
sarcastically characterizes Frazer's attitude toward magic: "Magic resulted from early man's inability
to distinguish between his own subjective associations and external objective reality. Its origin was
based on a mistake. No doubt about it, the savage was a credulous fool." M. DOUGLAS, supra note 15,
at 23. She concludes: "It is hard to forgive Frazer for his complacency and undisguised contempt of
primitive society." Id. at 24.
40. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111-35 (2d ed. 1970).
41. Compare p. 7 (cultural theory of risk does not deny reality of dangers) with p. 43 (Hima's
beliefs based on "real dangers").
42. Cf. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 105 (1976) ("[T]he 'cause' of a disease would depend on how, at any given time,
it could be most easily controlled.").
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Water from wells in medieval Europe may have been a "real danger," but
not because Jews were poisoning the wells. A pogrom to kill Jews would
not have reduced the "real dangers," but regulations that decrease the
levels of toxic pollutants such as heavy metals or carcinogens will.4
There is more to the process of risk selection in societies like ours than
causal knowledge regarding harm. Douglas and Wildavsky correctly point
out that attention to environmental risks involves a choice to devote less
time and fewer resources to other dangers like war, poverty, and racial
injustice, but this is hardly a new insight. Both environmentalists" and
lawyer-economists45 recognize that scarcity requires tradeoffs with other
worthy causes.
In view of their concern with alternative uses of resources, it is ironic
that Douglas and Wildasky dismiss economics. They do not see that the
cost side of a cost-benefit comparison is a measure (albeit rough and im-
perfect) of the alternative uses to which resources might be put.4 What
counts for society's risk selection decision is the comparison of what can be
done about a risk with what it takes to do it; the absolute magnitude of
risks is irrelevant. Thus, even if decisionmakers reject formal cost-benefit
analysis, they cannot escape making alternative allocations of scarce
resources.
Moreover, Douglas and Wildavsky reject cost-benefit analysis as bi-
ased.47 They fail to realize that the biases are not random: Cost-benefit
analysis systematically understates the relative attractiveness of pollution
control programs as compared with alternative uses of resources. 48 Thus,
cost-benefit analysis can be a useful tool when it demonstrates that an
environmental program is justified (although admittedly it is not necessa-
43. This is not to say that every environmental regulation is based on "good science," but only
that when they are, they can reach actual causes of harm. Cf Crandall & Lave, Introduction and
Summary, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS 1, 16 (R. Crandall & L.
Lave eds. 1981) (in five cases of health and safety regulation studied, technical "data and analysis
[were] not the sole basis for setting standards; indeed, they often do not serve as an important
resource").
44. See Commoner, Environment Is Not a Motherhood Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 47,
col. I ("Pursued to its source, every environmental issue generates a confrontation with the grave,
unsolved, intensely contested issues of the world-war, poverty, hunger and racial antagonism.").
45. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18 (1978) ("tragic choices" involved when
scarcity requires a distribution of goods that results in suffering or death).
46. Pp. 67-82. But see Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, in POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 55, 63-64 (A.
Ranney ed. 1968) (despite shortcomings, cost-benefit analysis tells "decision-makers something about
what they will be giving up if they follow alternative policies").
47. Pp. 69-70.
48. Articles by environmentalists criticizing cost-benefit analysis for systematically understating
the attractiveness of environmental regulations are legion. See, e.g., Baram, Cost Benefit Analysis: An
Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Dedsionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 473 (1980); Epstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Inspired by Rational Economics or a Protectionist
Philosophy?, AMICUS J., Spring 1982, at 41.
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rily valid when it reaches the opposite conclusion).
.Unlike Douglas and Wildavsky, lawyers have traditionally understood
environmental law as an amalgam of law, science, and economics.49
Wildavsky has criticized this approach for ignoring anthropology and for
failing to recognize that for environmentalists "the symbolic level is the
real one."50 Rather than add anthropology and symbolism to the mix of
factors that explains our society's selection of technological risks, Douglas
and Wildavsky fail to recognize anything but symbolism in environmental
decisions.
III.
Douglas and Wildavsky make a provocative and, I believe, an original
point when they call attention to risk selection as a social process. Knowl-
edge alone cannot explain social decisions about risks. Information about
the kind of risks we confront in complex technological societies may be
beyond our capacity to assimilate, and in any event, no normal person has
a taste for such dismal information in quantity. Organizations certainly do
channel and simplify information that individuals receive.5" Douglas and
Wildavsky, however, never support the assumption implicit in their focus
on the structure of environmental groups: that such groups are the pri-
mary channels that select and relay information about environmental
risks. Douglas and Wildavsky's own selection of source materials tends to
belie their assumption. In providing "illustrative episodes" 52 of decisions
about technological and environmental dangers, they turn to reports of
governmental regulatory proceedings in the popular press.53 Their exam-
ple suggests that press reports about governmental proceedings may shape
our view of technological and environmental risks.
In other areas of the law, the courts and the other parts of the legal
system are often portrayed as playing a role in shaping culture.54 There is
reason to believe, however, that the legal system is not performing its edu-
cational function well in the environmental area. One symptom is the
49. See B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN
SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1-2, passim (1974).
50. Wildavsky, Economy and Environment/Rationality and Ritual (Book Review), 29 STAN. L.
REV. 183, 193-94 (1976).
51. See H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIzATION 108-09 (3d ed. 1976).
52. P. 50.
53. Pp. 49-66.
54. In this spirit, Eugene Rostow once referred to United States Supreme Court Justices as
"teachers in a vital national seminar." Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952); see also D. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS:
ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692, at 188-89 (1979) (describing colonial courts as arenas for development of
public norms).
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widespread-and erroneous-belief among the American public that
"everything causes cancer."5 Another is the fear many communities have
about the transportation of nuclear wastes, while they readily accept ship-
ments of other, more hazardous cargoes. 56 The list of inconsistent public
attitudes toward technological and environmental risks is a long one.
Many cultural factors may be important in understanding patterns of
public fear, but I want to focus on one aspect of the social process that is
particularly relevant to lawyers and that helps to explain the widespread
confusion and paranoia about technological risks. I believe that only part
of the message about what transpires in courts and regulatory agencies
dealing with environmental risks is getting through to the public.
My evidence is only impressionistic, but the press seems to report
clearly and dramatically the charges and fears expressed in government
proceedings on environmental hazards. Final decisions by responsible offi-
cials do not usually receive comparable attention. Final decisions generally
resolve problems by implementing measures to deal with a risk or by ex-
plaining why the claims of risk have been discounted. A bias in the flow
of information in favor of charges and against outcomes could tend to ac-
centuate public fears about the risks of technology.
The structure and incentives of the press may contribute to this imbal-
ance.51 At least part of the fault, however, lies with environmental institu-
tions, which do not justify their decisions in a way that is even minimally
accessible to the press and public.58 It is not surprising, therefore, that in
Risk and Culture Douglas and Wildavsky never once refer to a primary
source like agency decisions reported in the Federal Register.
There are undoubtedly many reasons why environmental agencies ex-
press themselves in a way that makes it nearly impossible for them to
perform their educational function well. I want to focus on one aspect of
administrative law to illustrate why agencies may have no incentive to
explain their decisions clearly. There may even be incentives for them to
obfuscate.
When the basic principles of administrative law were formulated, the
drafters of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA)59 did provide
that a "concise general statement" of "basis and purpose" must accom-
55. See S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 32-33 (rev. ed. 1979).
56. See Mills & Mills, Moving A-Waste, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1983, at A23, col. 4.
57. See Yoder, From Mud to Mudslides, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1983, at C7, ol. 1 (chemical waste
and nuclear power stories with "EPA men in their rubber suits" make "better pictures" for television
news than do stories about abstract issues such as budget deficits).
58. See Ackerman & Elliott, Air Pollution 'Rights,' N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at A23, col. 3
(criticizing EPA for obscuring issues "in an 8,000-word regulatory initiative full of jargon and
technicalities").
59. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
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pany rules published in the Federal Register."0 As courts and agencies
adapted informal rulemaking to proceedings never contemplated when the
APA was drafted, however, the "statement of basis and purpose" took on
a function different from its original purpose of informing the public."
Today, this statement forms the primary basis for judicial review.62 Under
the "hard look" standard of review in environmental cases, 3 agencies
must respond to each significant comment in a rulemaking that may in-
volve hundreds of parties and tens of thousands of record pages.6
No procedural instrument can perform two functions as different as
informing the public about complex issues and forming the basis for an
agency's defense of its action in court.65 This does not mean that we
should abolish judicial review or even meliorate the "hard look" standard
of review in environmental cases. Rather, we should recognize that en-
hanced judicial review of informal rulemaking has altered the statement of
basis and purpose so that it can no longer fulfill its original function.
New procedural mechanisms, unrelated to judicial review, are needed to
encourage agencies to make simple, common-sense statements of the na-
ture of problems in their area of responsibility and the solutions they pro-
pose. A number of ways to improve communication between agencies and
the public have been suggested,6 6 and others can be imagined.67 Specific
60. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
61. In at least one recent environmental statute, the original function of the "statement of basis
and purpose" has been preserved. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2625(f) (1982)
("Any final order issued under this chapter shall be accompanied by a statement of its basis and
purpose. The contents and adequacy of any such statement shall not be subject to judicial review in
any respect.").
62. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Automotive Parts
& Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
63. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451-52 & n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("hard
look" demands remand to agency for more adequate explanation or supplementary data). See gener-
ally Rogers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO.
L.J. 699 (1979) (reviewing "hard look" cases).
64. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring) ("agency [must] set forth with clarity the grounds for its rejection
of opposing views"); Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in
Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. LAW 301, 309 (1981) ("Few practitioners believe
that judges read, much less studiously follow, the monstrous records thrust before them. Nor do these
records deserve reading, contrived and formless as they are.").
65. But see Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 653, 655 (1971) ("The true measure of the quality of a judicial system is how many hidden
problems it brings into public view and how well it stimulates the responsible officials and agencies
into doing something about these problems.").
66. See EPA Policy on Public Participation, 46 Fed. Reg. 5736 (1981). Other devices that also
hold some promise are increased Congressional oversight over agency rulemaking, but see INS v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (legislative veto unconstitutional), and the proposed "regulatory
budget," see Regulatory Budgeting and the Need for Cost-Effectiveness in the Regulatory Process:
Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); C. DeMuth, R. Shackson,
E. Stork & A. Wright, The Regulatory Budget as a Management Tool for Reforming Regulation
(May 29, 1979) (unpublished paper) (John F. Kennedy School of Gov't, Harvard Univ.).
67. If encouraging social dialogue about risk selection were the only goal, one might want to
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remedies are less important, however, than that responsible people in
agencies dealing with risks realize that what they say and how they say it
can be almost as important as what they do."8
require each environmental agency to make a public annual report justifying its actions and proposed
agenda to a committee of citizens (an EPA board of directors?).
68. The new EPA administrator, appointed after this Review was written, appears to be more
sensitive than his predecessors to the agency's educational function. See Ruckelshaus, How E.P.A.
Faces the Arsenic Risk, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, at A22, col. 1 (defending EPA decision to request
comments from public on whether health risks posed by copper smelter are acceptable); see also Ruck-
elshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 SCIENCE 1026, 1028 (1983) (scientific community
should join with EPA in effort to educate public on risk issues).
Culture and Conflicting Rationalities
Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and
Environmental Dangers. By Mary Douglas and Aaron
Wildavsky. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Pp. ix,
221. $14.95.
Douglas MacLean t
In a brief period around 1970, Congress enacted a remarkable set of
laws to protect the environment and the public health. These laws include
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, and the Endangered Species Act; they led to the creation of
some of our most important regulatory agencies.
This flurry of regulatory activity is reminiscent of the New Deal; the
regulatory goals, however, are quite different. In the 1930's, the public's
faith in unregulated markets had been shaken. The government responded
with laws and programs to secure jobs and income, to pave the way for
economic recovery, and in general to correct for market failures. In con-
trast, the environmentalism of the early 1970's generated support for leg-
islation that would intervene in normally functioning markets to promote
other, noneconomic values.
Environmental legislation tends to be single-mindedly protectionist,
with little concern for economic incentives or impacts. It mandates, for
example, that regulatory agencies set enforceable standards to protect the
public's health from air pollution, ensure a safe and healthful workplace,
prohibit economic development that destroys endangered species, or guar-
antee the safety of drinking water. For the most part, these laws do not
instruct agencies to balance the environmental or health goals of regula-
tion against its other costs and benefits; in fact, some prohibit agencies
from doing so. They give regulators little guidance in determining when
the increasing marginal cost of greater protection becomes too great a
price to pay.
Largely because of this single-mindedness, the environmental and
health statutes of the early 1970's are now under attack in the crusade for
regulatory reform. Despite criticisms from industry, professional policy
t Senior Research Associate, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland.
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analysts, economists, and even some regulators, however, these laws re-
main politically difficult to change. Environmental groups stand ready to
fight any attempt to reverse the gains they made a decade ago, and these
groups claim a broad base of public support. In the fall of 1981, for in-
stance, well after the Reagan election had been interpreted as a mandate
for less governmental intervention in the economy, the pollster Louis Har-
ris suggested that the public might not welcome attempts to reform envi-
ronmental legislation, claiming that a substantial majority of Americans,
sixty-five percent, opposed any cost constraints on health standards in the
Clean Air Act.' Harris gave the following summary of his findings:
But I am saying to you just as clear as can be that Clean Air
happens to be one of the sacred cows of the American people, and
the suspicion is afoot, however you slice it, that there are interests in
the business community, and among Republicans and some Demo-
crats who want to keelhaul that legislation.
And people are saying, "Watch out. We will have your hide if
you do it." That is the only message that comes out of this as clear
cut as anything I have ever seen in my professional career.2
I.
The environmental movement in America combines a reverence for na-
ture with an antagonism toward technologies like nuclear power. It is a
remarkable patchwork of sacred cows and b&es noirs. Risk and Culture3
is the attempt of two well-known scholars in different fields to understand
this puzzling phenomenon and to explain the controversy over environ-
mental regulation. Mary Douglas, a social anthropologist, has been devel-
oping for some years a theory about how cultural groups identify dangers
and respond to them.4 Aaron Wildavsky is an expert on American politics
and an iconoclastic policy analyst.5
Douglas and Wildavsky are struck by "the moralism of [environmental]
legislation-setting standards that could not be met, using legal orders to
1. Health Standards for Air Pollutants: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Envi-
ronment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 265 (1981) (statement
of Louis Harris).
2. Id. at 299.
3. M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECH-
NICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
4. See M. DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS: ESSAYS IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1975); M. DOUGLAS,
NATURAL SYMBOLS (1970); M. Douglas, Cultural Bias (Royal Anthropological Inst. occasional paper
No. 35 (1978)).
5. For work related to Risk and Culture, see A. WILDAVSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY
ANALYSIS 385-406 (1979); Wildavsky, Richer Is Safer, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1980, at 23; Wildav-
sky, No Risk Is the Highest Risk of All, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32 (1979).
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enforce them, refusing to consider costs."6 They are also struck by how
risk perceptions differ among individuals and groups. People are selective
about which risks concern them in ways that are difficult to understand.
Douglas and Wildavsky's "cultural analysis" attempts to connect and ex-
plain these facts-the selective concerns about risk and moralistic environ-
mental policies.7
Cultural analysis treats these phenomena quite differently than does
risk analysis, the professional discipline that emerged with the regulatory
legislation of the 1970's and attempted to develop methods and decision
procedures for promulgating health and safety standards. Risk analysts
devote much attention in their professional journals to the attitudes of en-
vironmentalists;' they understand that if their recommendations are to
have any practical effect on public policy, they must come to terms with
the disparity between expert judgment and public perception. They disa-
gree, however, on the proper manner to deal with this gap. Some risk
analysts conclude that the selective concerns of environmentalists should
not receive special attention.' Regulatory agencies, after all, are estab-
lished to protect the public, not to satisfy it; by exposing our irrationali-
ties, risk analysis can help us reduce environmental harms at least cost.
Other risk analysts show more deference to public attitudes.10 To be polit-
ically neutral, they argue, risk analysis must accept the preferences people
express and attach greater weight to more dreaded risks as well as to
"intangible" (that is, difficult to measure) benefits.
Douglas and Wildavsky find both responses unsatisfactory: "The cur-
rent theories of risk perception steer badly between overintellectualizing
the decision process and overemphasizing irrational impediments.""1 They
find that sympathetic psychologists explain differences in risk perception
by attributing to individuals capacities for discrimination and rationaliza-
tion that are too elaborate to be plausible. At the same time, they argue
that unsympathetic risk analysts, those who label all beliefs inconsistent
with their own as irrational, fail to understand the processes that lead
people to adopt the preferences they express.
Douglas and Wildavsky claim that social processes and group dynamics
determine personal attitudes about risk. 2 They believe that shared social
values are the key to determining risk selection. "Humans are not isolated
6. P. 163.
7. P. 38.
8. See Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, Weighing the Risks, ENVIRONMENT, May 1979, at 17.
9. Krouch & Wilson, Regulation of Carcinogens, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 47, 47, 56 (1981).
10. See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, How Safe Is Safe Enough?: A Psycho-
metric Study Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POL'Y Scl. 127 (1978).
11. P. 84.
12. Pp. 89-90.
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individuals," they write. "Their sociality should be included in the analy-
sis of how their minds work. In risk perception, humans act less as indi-
viduals and more as social beings who have internalized social pressures
and delegated their decision-making processes to institutions.""
Social forms determine why, in a heterogeneous society, people focus on
certain risks and ignore others. They explain, for example, why environ-
mentalists are afraid of pollution but seem blind to the social consequences
of our economic problems; why executives are afraid of inflation and high
interest rates but can be cavalier about poisoning the air and water; or
why some government officials can regard both economic and environmen-
tal risk as insignificant compared to threats to our national security.
This book is certainly one of the most interesting and provocative con-
tributions to risk analysis since Chauncey Starr first proposed a quantita-
tive technique for comparing the risks and benefits of new technologies.14
But it will not be a popular one, especially among the environmental
groups whose behavior the authors are trying to explain.
Environmentalists are portrayed as afraid and in need of enemies;5
they are accused of welcoming the use of "other people's money to keep
competitors away from the wilderness;" 6 their rise is attributed in part to
"a cadre of white activists, accustomed to leadership and trained to re-
present deprived groups" who, when blacks took over the civil rights
movement, were "left out of work and free to lead the fight against risks
perpetrated by giant corporations and big government." 17 In an invidious
comparison to apocalyptic millennialists and the McCarthyites of the
1950's, environmentalists are said to be driven by a "fear of subversion by
invisible forces."1 8
Attacks like these are not only unfair, but also unfortunate; they may
lead readers to dismiss this book as yet another denunciation of the suc-
cesses and excesses of environmentalism and thus to fail to appreciate its
strikingly original analysis of social conflicts in American life. The au-
thors recognize that their best strategy is "to describe with impartial care
the deducible consequences of preferring one form of social organization
over others."1 But the attitudes exhibited by the risk analyst (that our
risks are complicated, but manageable) or the entrepreneur (that risk is
opportunity) are spared the insults reserved for the environmentalist. By
failing to be impartial, the book does a serious injustice to its own theory.
13. Pp. 79-80.






The Yale Law Journal
II.
Risk and Culture focuses on the meaning of pollution, as both an envi-
ronmental and an anthropological concept. Unlike the environmentalist,
the anthropologist treats pollution beliefs as mechanisms to uphold cul-
tural values. To Douglas and Wildavsky, pollution beliefs "function to
keep some categories of people apart so that others can be together. By
preserving the physical categories, pollution beliefs uphold conceptual cat-
egories dividing the moral from the immoral and so sustain the vision of
the good society."'20 For example, consider the Hima, a cattle-herding
tribe in Uganda. The main threat to their way of life is assimilation.
Their fertile grazing land is ideal for agriculture, and a neighboring tribe,
the Iru, thrives by cultivating the soil. The Hima believe two things will
cause cattle to die: contact with women and mixing vegetables with cows'
milk in human diets. The first belief keeps women apart from economic
activity and free to pursue the Hima ideal of beauty, which involves
drinking a great deal of milk and becoming fat. A beautiful wife is shared
with a man's neighbors, which serves to attract other men, who will pool
their cattle together into viable herding units. The second belief closes the
door to agriculture among the Hima and also makes intermarriage with
the Iru impossible.2 '
Douglas and Wildavsky make clear that threats must be real for pollu-
tion beliefs to be reasonable. "Just as cows do really die, so do Iru succeed
in really transforming the Hima way of life. The threat is not at all
idle."22 The causal beliefs of the Hima, then, although utterly false em-
pirically, may nonetheless serve as a weapon in the fight for cultural sur-
vival: "The Hima are clearly using their ideas about bovine nature to
hold up a fragile social system. They are using nature in a rearguard
action against change."2 Such beliefs are not simply irrational; nor can
they be explained in psychological terms alone.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky, cultural sects similar to the
Hima (for example, the Amish) have always thrived on the border of
American life. The survival of these sects also depends on pollution be-
liefs, which protect the sects' values from the center or mainstream cul-
ture. The environmental movement, Douglas and Wildavsky argue, is also
largely sectarian. Many environmental groups are motivated not simply
by a concern for physical health or the preservation of species, but also by
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Alliance, Douglas and Wildavsky claim, because they oppose nuclear
power "both as a technology and as the manifestation of undemocratic
unresponsiveness to individual needs within American society." '24 Nuclear
society is seen as authoritarian; nonnuclear society as promoting equality
and democracy. 25 Because the egalitarian ideals of environmental sects
prevent these groups from creating formal organizational structures, their
membership is held together by uncompromising beliefs and opposition to
evils outside the sect. Nuclear power or environmental pollution becomes
their weapon in a political war: "[T]he critics of our society are using
nature in the old primitive way: impurities in the physical world or chem-
ical carcinogens in the body are directly traced to immoral forms of eco-
nomic and political power. ' Thus, the analogy between groups like the
Clamshell Alliance and the Hima.
III.
Sects are distinguished by two features: First, they have a weak internal
structure, which makes them vulnerable to external threats; second, they
compensate for this weakness with pollution beliefs, which strengthen
their cohesiveness by creating a strong group identity." Pollution beliefs
create a "wall of virtue," which gives the sect a moral identity and distin-
guishes it from the evil world outside. Sects rely on moral suasion to
maintain the allegiance of their members.
The basic weakness of the Clamshell Alliance, apparently, is its
steadfast commitment to egalitarianism and direct democracy. It prevents
the Alliance from becoming a strong and stable group because it makes it
almost impossible for leaders to emerge. Without leadership, the Alliance
cannot engineer political success through negotiation; it cannot secure its
existence with long-range plans and strategies; it is not flexible. So within
the group, opposition to nuclear power is not seen as just one campaign
against one reactor siting, but is elevated to an ideology. Nuclear power
becomes a symbol of corruption in American society. The importance of
the cause strengthens the allegiance of the group's members.
This explains why sects are supposed to be able to exist only on the
24. P. 149.
25. This argument is frequently made. For its most famous and influential version, see Lovins,
Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1976).
26. P. 47.
27. P. 138. Some environmental groups, however, are hierarchical. They utilize organized lobby-
ists and intervene in regulatory proceedings. They have their own experts, and they show up in the
courts. They do not get involved with the direct action championed by the Clamshell Alliance. Among
successful organizations like the Union of Concerned Scientists or the Natural Resources Defense
Council, one does not find simplistic anti-nuclear attitudes. Their positions are always more sophisti-
cated, usually more qualified. P. 130.
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borders of American society, as critics of the centers of power. If a sect
were successful enough, it would eventually have to develop its own lead-
ership and otherwise alter its structure in ways necessary for wielding
political power. It would thus be transformed into a different kind of cul-
tural group (as was the Sierra Club after it met with success) or else it
would disintegrate.
What is truly interesting about cultural analysis, however, is not so
much its portrayal of environmental sects but rather its more ambitious
and general explanation of cultural differences. By varying the two fea-
tures that distinguish sects, all cultural forms can be understood. Group
identity can be strong, as it is in sects, or it can be weak. The degree of
structure or differentiation within a group-the "grid," as it is
called-can be high, or it can be low. Cultural forms are determined by
these two features alone, and so the number of possible cultural types is
therefore quite small. Only three different kinds of culture are described
in Risk and Culture. These are: the sectarian, the hierarchical, and the
market individualist. With each cultural type comes a characteristic set of
attitudes, values, and social requirements that Douglas and Wildavsky call
a "type of rationality."2
If the culture is strong in group identity but weak in internal structure,
then it is a sect. If it is strong in group identity but at the other end of the
grid scale, that is, strong in internal structure or differentiation, then it is
hierarchical, as in a caste system.29 Sects tend to be egalitarian and, in
America, to have voluntary membership; in hierarchies, however, the
membership is closed, so the cost of leaving can be made high. Hierarchies
can maintain loyalties through a system of rewards and punishments.
Loyalty in hierarchies is rewarded through success in moving up the lad-
der, benefits that cannot be taken with individuals when they leave the
group, and so on. Through such devices, hierarchies replace the need for
pollution beliefs.
Hierarchists trust their experts or their priests. American hierarchies
include organized religions, industrial organizations, and Washington bu-
reaucracies. Where sectarians are moral absolutists, American hierarchists
are portrayed as sharing a belief that perseverance through the system
will solve our problems. Hierarchical morality is more pragmatic, more
flexible. It reflects a faith in existing institutions as organic, progressively
evolving systems. Unlike the sectarian, who thinks that the future will be
discontinuous with the present, the hierarchist is convinced of its similar-
ity; all he worries about is ensuring a smooth transition.
28. P. 104.
29. Pp. 116-25.
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At the other end of the group scale, that is, low in group identity, we
find the market individualists.3" They also happen to be low in grid and
thus strongly egalitarian. Individualists embody the rationality of utility
theory. They are oriented to the present: They have little concern for the
future; little use for history and tradition; and an overriding moral con-
cern for procedural fairness, the protection of individual liberties, and just
rewards for personal accomplishment.
The center of American society is occupied by hierarchists and market
individualists. In spite of vast differences in basic outlook, they can
coexist:
The two have some similar ideas about danger. Both give priority to
any threat to the whole system, whichever it is. Both are sensitive to
the public confidence that maintains it. Both like to protect univer-
salistic rules, but the hierarchist wants rules of instruction, while the
individualist wants fair-play rules that do not stipulate what is to be
done. Both have imperialist tendencies, since both can solve their or-
ganizational problems by expanding the field of operations-bigger
markets, larger collectives. 31
Viewed from this perspective, risk analysis would appear to be a tech-
nique thought up by market individualists (having lost the battle over reg-
ulatory legislation) to be sold to hierarchical government bureaucrats. The
former endorse risk analysis because it expresses their conception of ra-
tionality; the latter will accept it if they can be convinced that it conforms
to the purposes of the rules and the intent of the rulemakers. In any event,
these two kinds of social beings cooperate to dominate the center. Sectari-
ans, on the other hand, see the center as corrupt and thrive by condemn-
ing it from the border.
IV.
The authors' grid/group structure of cultural analysis tells us, then,
that sectarian cultures will adopt the absolutist moral beliefs described by
pollution theory; market individualist cultures will ground social values in
individual freedom and seek to maximize preference satisfaction; and hier-
archical cultures will be more oriented to tradition. To call each outlook a
different rationality simply means that each set of shared values displays a
coherence that carries over to the group's attitudes about danger.
But is all this true? By what standards should we evaluate cultural
analysis, and how should we compare it to the more individualistic, psy-
30. Pp. 90-97.
31. P. 97.
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chologically oriented risk analysis? Cultural analysis does not give us
much hope for finding a neutral decision procedure for resolving risk con-
troversies. Rather, it suggests that in a heterogeneous society like the
United States the policy analyst's quest for an environmental algorithm
will be as futile as the alchemist's search for the philospher's stone. Nor
does cultural analysis seem to promise better predictions about our soci-
ety's willingness to accept new technologies or different environmental
policies. So if we are committed to the view that risk attitudes should be
explained scientifically-in the value-neutral, behavioristic, predictive
model laid down by Galileo for the physical sciences-we will be likely to
find the grid/group structure in Risk and Culture disturbing and perhaps
a bit cranky.
But if we are not interested in joining the debate about the proper
method for social science-whether it should be Galilean or more descrip-
tive and hermeneutical 32-we can simply ask whether cultural analysis
helps us understand attitudes toward risk and the controversy over regula-
tory policies. The answer to this question, I think, is mixed.
Risk analysis appeals to psychological data to explain risk selection:
Certain properties of a technology or an environmental hazard cause peo-
ple to weigh the consequences of a risk more heavily. This approach pro-
vides the risk analyst with a psychological account of why public concerns
about risk are sometimes at variance with expert assessments. The risk
analyst can then treat people as if they were utility maximizers. The
dreaded qualities simply affect their estimates of the probabilities or the
weight of the consequences. But in many instances this kind of explana-
tion seems too artificial to be true.
Recently, a proposed site for a liquified energy gas terminal in Califor-
nia was rejected, in part because of public concern over the potential
hazards to nearby communities. 3 One of these was a worst-case scenario
reported in the risk assessment done for the government agency consider-
ing the site. This scenario would have led to the death of 113,000 local
inhabitants; it was estimated to have a likelihood of only 10-57,3 4 which I
calculate to be less than the probability of being simultaneously struck by
lightning and hit by a meteorite! That estimate could be off by more than
thirty orders of magnitude, and the risk would still be negligible. The
pollution theory of cultural analysis seems a much more plausible expla-
32. For a discussion of this debate, see R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 191-210
(1982).
33. See H. KUNREUTHER, J. LINNEROOTH, J. LATHROP, H. ATZ, S. MACGILL, C. MANDL, M.
SCHWARZ & M. THOMPSON, RISK ANALYSIS AND DECISION PROCESSES: THE SITING OF LEG FACILI-
TIES IN FOUR COUNTRIES 233-315 (International Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis report no. A-2361,
Mar. 1982) (preliminary draft).
34. Id. at 302.
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nation of the opposition to the site that results from this estimate than
does the preference theory of risk analysis. 35
Cultural analysis makes sense of other phenomena as well. For in-
stance, the sherpas of Khumbu, those "adventurous traders" of the
Himalyas, have hired themselves out in recent years to high-risk climbing
expeditions, even though their probability of being killed is one in six. 6
These risk-takers, all Buddhists, stand in sharp contrast to the Hindu
farmers, the "cautious cultivators," who live nearby. Michael Thompson
explains this constrast by the different positions the Hindus and Buddhists
occupy on a group axis. The Buddhist sherpa
lives in an atomized social world in which the nuclear family is the
economic unit and in which all sorts of institutions militate against
the formation of coercive social relationships. . . . His Hindu neigh-
bor, by contrast, is a member of a joint family that is intricately
bound together by all kinds of tightly knotted rights and obligations,
and his most important resource of all-land-remains firmly in the
control of the elderly head of that family. In such a situation, there is
little incentive, or even opportunity, for personal risk-taking. 37
The social structure of the Hindu leads to risk-sharing and to individual
risk-avoiding. Since the Buddhist sherpa cannot protect himself by spread-
ing risk, and since he need not share his rewards, he regards risk as
opportunity.
Other phenomena that fit cultural analysis include the very different
forms that regulatory debates take in different societies. Great Britain is
basically a hierarchical society, and regulatory movements there typically
proceed in a nonlitigious fashion from the top down, from experts to the
public. In the United States, where sectarianism survives, regulation often
proceeds from the bottom up. Public action comes first, and the govern-
ment responds to the pressure. Consider, for instance, the difference in the
anti-smoking movements of Britain and the United States. Thompson
says:
In Britain we could find only three or four anti-smoking groups;
in the United States we found 41 (not counting the 91 independent
35. A number like Io" is, of course, not only unimaginable, but an estimate this small is also
hard to believe. It is an example of the kind of meaningless precision that has given risk assessments a
bad reputation. Opponents of the site might have taken this estimate as an indication that the entire
assessment was not to be trusted.
36. M. Thompson, To Hell with the Turkeys!: A Diatribe Directed at the Pernicious Trepidity
of the Current Intellectual Debate on Risk 4-6 (Center for Philosophy and Pub. Policy, Univ. of
Maryland, working paper RC-5, Mar. 1983); Thompson, Aesthetics of Risk: Culture or Context, in
SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 273 (R. Schwing & W. Albers, Jr., eds. 1980).
37. M. Thompson, supra note 36, at 5.
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chapters of GASP-Group Against Smokers' Pollution) .... British
ASH (Action on Smoking and Health) is the joint creation of the
Royal College of Physicians and the Health Education Council
... [It] sees its task as but one facet of preventive medicine ... ;
American ASH focuses on the single issue of non-smokers' rights.
S. . British anti-smoking is essentially dull-a sober-sided and
carefully worded affair; American anti-smoking is fun-all ad hoc
exuberance and righteous razzmatazz. Or, to put it at its most offen-
sive, anti-smoking in Britain is biased toward saving the lives of the
poor unfortunate smokers; anti-smoking in America is biased toward
putting those filthy despicable people in their place (and serve them
right if they get cancer!).3"
V.
These examples show how cultural analysis can help us understand
what is going on in different instances of risk selection and in different
kinds of environmental controversies. But even if we are sympathetic to
this kind of explanation, there are some difficulties and problems, some
things cultural analysis ought to explain but does not.
One of these is the immense public support in the United States for the
regulatory legislation of the 1970's. Douglas and Wildavsky claim that
this popularity reflects a brief moment when the center was weak and the
border triumphant,39 but this explanation seems to be incompatible with
the enduring popularity of environmentalism, as reflected in public opin-
ion polls.4" If environmental sects must remain small to survive, moveover,
how can support for sectarian positions on pollution standards be so over-
whelming? Why is it so politically difficult today to reform these
regulations?
To try to answer these questions in terms of grid and group is to dis-
cover a rather large problem with the theory. Figure 1 shows how we
might chart the different cultural forms. It defines the three rationalities
or patterns of shared beliefs and attitudes. But what about the upper-left-
quadrant of Figure 1? This section should be filled in with those people
who are low on group identity and see themselves as filling positions in a
stratified society. Thompson describes this kind of person as a peripheral
character, who is ineffectual because he has no group identity and little
social mobility.4" He does not prescribe but is prescribed to. In anthropo-
logical terms, he is a Rubbish Man; in America, a mainstream, middle
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. P. 162.
40. See supra p. 901.
41. M. Thompson, supra note 36, at 16-18.
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class housewife or blue collar worker. The majority of Americans, I sus-
pect, find themselves in this quadrant. Opinion polls show that they are
important in the risk debates, even if they do not move to the right on the
group axis (say, by joining labor unions) to become actors and prescribers.










Risk and Culture tells us nothing about these people and their atti-
tudes. Why are they afraid for their health and the environment? No so-
cial pressures, no survival needs, push them to adopt certain attitudes, and
yet it is the support of this group that permits environmental sects to vie
with the hierarchists and individualists who supposedly dominate the
center.
A second problem with cultural analysis arises when we ask why par-
ticular risks, technologies, and forms of pollution become the centers of
controversy while others do not. Douglas and Wildavsky cannot explain,
for instance, why nuclear fission and radiation stimulate such extraordi-
nary responses. Why is nuclear power a symbol of sectarian fears, and not
electricity generated from coal, about which there are at least as many
environmental uncertainties? Why is radiation from reactors so much
more dreaded than equivalent amounts of x-ray radiation? Until we can
answer these questions, we cannot be sure that culture, and not individual
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psychology or even something more mysterious, is the guiding factor in
risk selection.42
VI.
A book as provocative as Risk and Culture will inevitably stimulate
much criticism. I have chosen to focus on a narrow range of issues about
the robustness of cultural analysis and to ignore other controversial issues,
like the invidious characterization of environmentalists as primitive or
methodological questions about whether cultural analysis constitutes good
social science. I have suggested that cultural analysis cannot, in the end,
supplant risk analysis and psychological explanations of risk selection. But
it can and should supplement them.
Risk and Culture is a short, lively book that brings a new outlook to a
difficult problem in public policy. Cultural analysis adds a needed dimen-
sion to our understanding of risk selection and of the difficulty of deter-
mining socially acceptable levels of risk in a heterogeneous society like our
own. If the book succeeds in stimulating discussion about cultural values,
if it Makes policy analysts aware that values might be as complex, perva-
sive, and central to the problems of managing technological and environ-
mental risk as are toxic substances or radiation, then its other sins can be
forgiven, for it will have made a substantial contribution.
42. The associations between fission, radiation, and total destruction are very mysterious and
deep. For .more than half a century now, at least since H.G. WELLS, THE WORLD SET FREE: A
STORY OF MANKIND (1914), the idea of tinkering with the atom has produced ambivalent responses of
technological utopianism and total world destruction. By 1930, these tales had become so popular that
one nuclear optimist of the day felt compelled to deride the humanists who "pictured the diabolical
scientist tinkering heedlessly, like the bad small boy, with these enormous stores of sub-atomic energy,
and some sad day touching off the fuse and blowing our comfortable little globe to smithereens." R.
MILLIKEN, SCIENCE AND THE NEW CIVILIZATION 95 (1930). What makes these attitudes so amazing
is not simply that Milliken could have written this book today, but that he in fact wrote it nine years
before nuclear fission had even been discovered!
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